It is widely held that insurance discourages people from taking diagnostic tests since such tests can turn up information that leads to uninsurability. We develop a model in which some consumers are initially informed of their risk type and others are uninformed, and there is a treatment option. People decide whether to be tested, uninformed insurers offer contracts, and consumers select their contract and chose treatment. We show that testing is encouraged when information status and test results are restricted. Because the private value of information revealed by the test is positive, the uninformed take the test when the subsequent insurance market attains a Rothchild-Stiglitz equilibrium. The positive private value stems from the treatment option. We also show that the social value of information revealed in diagnostic tests is positive with or without a treatment option. Thus, market mechanisms provide optimal incentives for acquiring hidden knowledge when there is a treatment option.
INTRODUCTION
The view that insurance deters people from taking medical checkups and diagnostic tests has had widespread currency during the debate over health care reform. If a test revealed favorable results (e.g., HIV negative or the absence of the genetic defect causing Huntington's disease), the insurer would probably lower the premium, but unfavorable test results would result in a prohibitive premium or uninsurability. This classification lottery clearly is unattractive to risk averse consumers and might dissuade them from taking the test despite any medical or public health benefits. This view has been aired in the scientific and popular press and has entered policy analysis in Washington (Tabarrok, 1994) . Tabarrok formalizes the deterrent effects of insurance and provides extensive references to the policy and popular debate. 2 Though we consider life insurance policies throughout the article, most of the analysis can be applied to health insurance. The main difference is that, if health insurance does cover pre-existing conditions, it will cover the costs of treatment options revealed in the checkup. Thus the moral hazard problem which we address will disappear, producing a special case of our more general result. On the other hand, if pre-existing conditions are not covered, then the analysis is roughly similar for life and health insurance.
We will show that markets will provide optimal incentives for consumers to take diagnostic tests if there are initially informed and uninformed consumers and an option for treatment, and if information status and the test results are confidential. We will show that the social value of information revealed by diagnostic tests is also positive. Consumers must anticipate how their private knowledge will affect the choices they exercise from policy menus offered by insurers in a competitive market. We will show that the information revealed by the test has positive private value, thus encouraging consumers to be tested. This positive value arises jointly from the ability of consumers to hide information status and the value of the contingent option for treatment. Thus, competitive markets will encourage consumers to make socially optimal choices. Formally, our study addresses adverse selection, moral hazard and the value of information. We will show that the hidden nature of information status adds an important second dimension to the standard Rothchild-Stiglitz model. Self selection screening models traditionally start with an assumption that one agent is uninformed of the risk type of the others, and the uninformed party offers a menu designed to induce sorting. We start with both informed and uninformed consumers but the latter can choose whether to acquire information. Uninformed consumers must decide whether to take a test which will reveal their propensity for death or ailment. Insurers who are uninformed as to who takes the test or the results, offer a menu of life (or health) insurance policies 2 designed to induce self selection according to information status and test results. Moreover, insurers must anticipate that those taking the test may receive options for treatment which can be exercised after insurance is chosen, thus introducing an element of moral hazard. In choosing whether to take the test, consumers anticipate how information revealed will affect their choice from the insurer's menu and how they will exercise the treatment option. Thus, we model a game in which insurers cannot tell whether a consumer possesses hidden knowledge, and some consumers are initially uninformed but may choose to acquire hidden knowledge, thereby changing the nature of the informational asymmetry from one in which the uninformed cannot be contracted with separately ex ante to one like the Rothchild-Stiglitz model wherein all consumers possess hidden knowledge. We will show that taking the test is the dominant strategy for the uninformed for the preliminary information game and that the Nash equilibrium requires that all consumers become informed.
This article is related to a previous literature on the social value of information, insurance classification, adverse selection, medical decision making, etc. We will mention only some of the closer fits. The social value of information has been addressed by Hirshleifer (1971) and Arrow (1978) who, extending the work of Dreze (1960) , showed that improved public information may make everyone worse off (by eliminating opportunities to reallocate risk through trade). Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Marshall (1974) show that if parties negotiate ex ante efficient contracts, subsequently generated information does not expand allocative opportunities and has no social value. This work was extended by Crocker and Snow (1992) who showed that, if agents start with prior hidden information, further private information might have (positive or negative) social value. Our analysis differs in several respects. First, while concerned with determining the social value of information, our main focus is whether private markets will provide incentives for socially optimal behavior. We focus on individuals who must assess the private value of information to decide whether to take a diagnostic test. We will exhibit the sequential Nash equilibria that might result from different information regimes and show how the efficiency and distributive aspects of such equilibria affect private decisions on diagnostic tests. Second, we will consider a context in which individuals differ in their initial information endowments. This implies that consumers will not only signal the content of private information but also their information status. When the uninformed acquire hidden information, these signaling costs create externalities for those who were initially informed. We must determine the effects of new information, not only on the utility of those who make the acquisition, but also on those originally informed. Third, we consider how the generation of information affects the production technologies chosen. In this respect, our study resembles Hoy (1989) who examines the social value of screening mechanisms in insurance when the information generated is important in selecting the most efficient loss reduction technology or treatment. Whereas Hoy examines only cases where information from the screening test is symmetrically distributed, we consider asymmetric access to such information and the adverse selection problems that result.
Finally, this study is similar to Doherty and Thistle (1996) in that it examines the nature of insurance equilibria when information (testing) is endogenously determined. However, while Doherty and Thistle consider the loss production technology to be fixed and show information has a zero private value (under comparable assumptions to those used here), we consider that testing decisions will be determined inter alia by the treatment opportunities they generate. While Doherty and Thistle consider the effects of observability of information status and testing costs on the private value of information, we focus on whether private information gathering incentives are socially efficient. We have configured the environment and assumptions to address the issue of medical diagnostic tests.
SETUP, ASSUMPTIONS AND BASIC TECHNOLOGY
We structure the problem in the following way.
Step 1; the consumer chooses whether or not to have a checkup. The checkup will reveal risk type (high or low). High risks can seek treatment at cost s, which will reduce the probability of death.
Step 2; the consumer seeks insurance protection. The insurer does not know the results of the checkup (except in the baseline case of symmetric information). Since the insurer does not observe risk type it cannot condition insurance on the level of treatment and offers a menu designed to induce sorting of risk types. The insurer's policy menu also anticipates moral hazard from the high risk's treatment choices.
Step 3; if the checkup indicates that treatment is required, the consumer decides on the level of treatment. They do so knowing the terms of the policy they buy.
This system is solved backwards. Given the policy purchased, consumers decide on the level of treatment. Insurers, anticipating the treatment choices to be chosen, offer an appropriate contract menu from which consumers select. Finally, we look at the value of information, anticipating the level of treatment to be chosen and anticipating the insurance policies that will be purchased in equilibrium by the uninformed and the informed. Assumptions 1. We start with a population, some of whom know their risk type (they may have had thorough examinations in conjunction with treatment for a pre-existing condition) and some of whom do not. Those that do not can take a checkup at zero cost.
2. The checkup will reveal information on the mortality probability. The mortality probability can be reduced by treatment for those revealed to be of high risk. The production function for treatment p H (s) is known to all.
3. We first establish a baseline case in which insurers observe whether people have taken the test and, if so, the diagnosis. In the remainder of the study, insurers do not have this information. We assume that consumers always observe the results of the checkup whether or not it is observed by the insurer.
4. Insurers do know the proportions of high and low risks and know the mortality rates for people in different risk classes. They also know the effectiveness of treatment (its effect on mortality or probability of loss).
5. Consumers are risk averse, and insurers are effectively risk neutral (they are fully diversified with respect to insurable risk). Utility is assumed to be separable in the chosen level of treatment s. This format permits treatment costs to be measured in money and/or in psychic value such as discomfort.
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In our working paper we used a state dependent utility function. Since this did not materially affect our conclusions, we have used the simpler state independent form here. 4 The assumptions on loss reduction are similar to those made by Hoy (1989) in his DD (decreasing difference) case, i.e., the difference between p H and p L decreases as s increases. These assumptions, together with identical utility functions for all types, ensure the "single crossing property."
6. The utility function is state independent. An individual can go for a checkup, which we assume to be free. The checkup will reveal information such as blood pressure, cholesterol, latent conditions or diseases, such as heart defects, initial stages of cancers, etc. This information classifies individuals into risk types. For simplicity we assume only two types, high and low risk, each with a probability of dying of p i , i = H, L. We assume that the proportions of high and low risks in the population, % H and % L , are known to all. The test also reveals possible remedies to those that turn out to be high risks. They can treat their condition or change their life style, diet, etc. Such treatment has a cost s measured in utility terms, but reduces the probability of death from p H (0) (i.e. the probability of death for a high risk if no treatment is undertaken) to p H (s). Those who turn out to be low risks do not have opportunities, nor need, for treatment. The uninformed (subscripted U) are those who have not taken the checkup and have not established the need for treatment. The following assumptions are made on the loss probabilities:
5 It is assumed that when test results are made available, insurers can also verify treatment levels. 6 In this and subsequent two state diagrams, the treatment s is not shown directly; the state axes show only monetary wealth. Treatment affects both the probability of loss (thereby changing the slope of the high risk indifference curves) and has a direct cost (thereby shifting the position in two state money space of a high risk curve offering a fixed utility). These changes are embodied in our diagrams.
BENCHMARK CASE -SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
We will examine the private and social value of information that is privately revealed to insureds. However, it is useful first to establish a benchmark where insurers could observe information status, risk type and consumers choice of s (e.g., test results were revealed to insurers).
5 This baseline helps compare our results with others (e.g., Hoy, 1989; Tabarrok, 1994) and will be helpful later in explaining why information has positive value when it is hidden. We know that, in competition, policies will be fairly priced given these information conditions. In fact, insurers can offer "price only" contracts under these conditions. If the insurance policy is fairly priced then the
For high risks, the optimal policy solves:
-- (1) and the first order conditions are:
(2)
i.e., MB = MC. The low risks and the uninformed can be distinguished, so these two would be offered full insurance at actuarially fair rates. The solution is depicted in Figure 1 with the policies H*, U* and L* being offered respectively to high risks, uninformed and low risks. 6 Note that the price line for uninformed, p U , is based on Assumption (4). The indifference curves are labeled according to the loss probabilities of the agents, i.e., I(p i ). 
Figure 1 Full Information Equilibrium
Now what is the information decision? The private value of information to the uninformed is equal to the social value of information in this case since the contracts for the informed high and low risks are unchanged by the acquisition of information by the uninformed. We know that the uninformed consumers are faced with a choice between v(U*, p U ) and a lottery over v(H*, p H (s* )) and v(L*, p L ). Noting that the probabilities of being high risk and low risk are % H and % L , the value of information is: 
where H O is the actuarially fair full information contract for a high risk with probability of loss p H (0). Now the first square bracket in (5) can be called the value of the treatment option. It is the gain in utility to those who know they are high risk, from spending s* on treatment rather than spending s = 0. Now since, by equation (3), s* is the utility maximizing level of s, which is assumed to be a local and global maximum, the treatment option must have positive value. The second term in (5), can 7 With a concave utility function, this result follows directly from Jensen's inequality. 8 Our case resembles that of Hoy (1989) in which the loss reduction technology is DD (decreasing difference) and in which neither self protection nor aggregate insurance purchases are observed by insurers.
be called the insurance classification lottery. If uninformed, the policyholder has a policy offering full insurance at a fair price p u which satisfies assumption (iv). The decision to take the test exposes the consumer to a lottery; the consumer may turn out to be high risk with probability % H and have a premium based on p H , and she may turn out to be low risk with probability % L and have a premium based on p L . We will call this classification risk. Since the consumer is risk averse, this lottery reduces expected utility; and so the sign of the second square bracket in (5) is negative.
7 Overall, the private and social value of information for the benchmark case is indeterminate when there is a treatment option. This result was also generated by Hoy (1989) . 8 In the absence of a treatment option, i.e., when s = 0 and p H (s) = p H (0), a constant, the private and social value of information is unambiguously negative since the first term in (5) will equal zero and the second term will remain negative. In this case, the value of information is simply the insurance classification lottery.
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
In this section we address the following problem. An individual takes a test, e.g., a medical checkup. As before, the checkup gives information on the state of health and, if high risk type is revealed, permits treatment s, which will reduce the probability that a loss will occur. In this section, it is assumed that the life insurer does not observe the results of the test. While it is true that insurers sometimes require a medical checkup before underwriting a policy, this is not always the case. Moreover, a private checkup sometimes will be more probing than an insurance examination and may reveal conditions not shown on an insurance examination. A good reason for this is that the patient will be faced with different incentives for revealing information to the physician when taking a non-insurance test than when taking an insurance examination. Moreover, the insurer is unable to condition the contract on the level of treatment taken. The time line is as follows:
Uninformed consumers make decisions on whether a test is taken Risk type is revealed to the consumer but not to the insurer Insurance policies are offered and accepted Treatment is chosen by the individual.
These conditions describe a market with both adverse selection and moral hazard. We seek to ascertain whether a separating equilibrium can exist and, given such an equilibrium, whether individuals have an incentive to take the test, i.e., what is the value of information contained in the test.
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Recall that there are some individuals who already know their risk type through diagnostic testing for a previous illness.
Figure 2 Extensive Form Game
The extensive form of the game we are analyzing is captured roughly in Figure  2 . At node 1, the uninformed consumers decide whether they should get a checkup and become informed or remain uninformed. 9 The insurance company issues a menu of contracts that induces the consumers to self-select policies designed for their own risk type, but it does not know whether it is at node 2 or 3. If the insurer is at node 2, then there are two consumer types; high and low risks. If they are at node 3, there are three consumer types; high, low and uninformed (the uninformed have a probability of a loss which is less than the high risks and greater than the low risks as stated above). Therefore, the insurance company has two choices at this information set. If they believe they are at node 2, they offer a menu of two contracts, H and L 2 . If they believe they are at node 3, they offer a menu of three contracts, H, U and L 3 . But, when they design these menus, they take account of the fact that high risk individuals will subsequently choose a treatment level s, which is privately optimal for the contract they have chosen. Insurers must consider the treatment levels chosen under the H and L 2 contracts in the two type case (and the H, U and L 3 contracts in the three type case) in order to obtain incentive compatibility for the contract choices of individuals.
The equilibrium is derived by backward induction. We begin by deriving the optimality conditions for the level of treatment chosen by known high risks for any given contract ( i , ß i ). Then we identify the properties of the two contract separating equilibrium which would result if all parties knew they were at node 2 (taking the ex post treatment choices into consideration). Next, we move to node 3 and obtain the 10 Notice that observing s would be equivalent to observing risk and information type since only those with positive test results will consider treatment.
three contract separating equilibrium which would result if all parties knew they were at this node. Note that the moves available to insurers at nodes 2 and 3 are identical, i.e., these nodes form an information set for the insurer; the move up represents the two contract menu and the move down represents the three contract menu. This is because insurers do not know at which node they are. Finally, we consider node 1 and calculate the value of information for the uninformed consumers under each of the contract menus.
An equilibrium for the entire game requires that the insurer's beliefs about whether the uninformed become informed are consistent with the value of information to those consumers and vice versa. It will be shown that becoming informed is a dominant strategy for the uninformed in the preliminary information game, i.e., the value of information is positive regardless of whether a two contract or three contract menu is offered by insurers. Therefore, in equilibrium, the uninformed become informed and a two contract separating equilibrium is obtained.
Node 2: Insurers Expect the Uninformed to Become Informed
The Possible Two Contract Separating Equilibrium with No Uninformed Policyholders. An equilibrium can exist only if the assumptions made by insurers concerning the information status of policyholders in equilibrium are consistent with their actual decisions on becoming informed (taking the test). We consider first that insurers expect policyholders to become informed and offer the contract set H and L 2 depicted in Figure 3 . Before considering whether this equilibrium is feasible (it is consistent with the information assumptions on which the contract offer is made), consider first what a two contract Nash equilibrium would look like.
Due to information asymmetry, contracts cannot be conditioned on risk type, information type, or choice of s.
10 However, the insurer can offer a menu which anticipates the decisions of high risk consumers on s and satisfies self selection and other constraints. Consider first, the privately optimal decision of s for high risks ex post, i.e., after they have selected the high risk policy from the menu ( and are 
These first-order conditions can be used as the incentive compatibility constraints with respect to the moral hazard involving treatment. The insurer's problem is to design a profit maximizing contract menu that recognizes the moral hazard and adverse selection problems present. The market equilibrium contract menu can be determined by maximizing the expected utility of the low risks subject to the self selection constraint for high risks, an individual rationality constraint (participation) for high risks, an incentive compatibility constraint for high risks who buy the high risk policy and for high risks who might have purchased the low risk policy, and zero profit constraints for firms for the high and low risks. Using LaGrange multipliers, this becomes:
The properties of the contracts for low and high risks are illustrated in Figure 3 14 In equilibrium, the high risks choose policy H and the low risks choose policy L 2 . 
Figure 3 Two Contract Separating Equilibrium
Now, defining s U as the level of treatment chosen ex post by a known high risk if offered policy U (obtained by conditions equivalent to those in equations (6a) and (6b)), the self selection conditions for such a separating equilibrium are:
which, together with assumptions (ii) and (iii), give:
A separating equilibrium, which satisfies (9) and (10), is shown in Figure 4 . Note that
Node 1: Should the Uninformed Become Informed? (A) The Private Value of Information if Consumers Expect Insurers to Offer the Two Contract Separating Equilibrium.
The value of the information contained in the test to the individual, assuming this information is not observed by the insurer, is the difference between:
i. the expected utility of the individual if informed (bearing in mind the test can reveal one to be high or low risk with probabilities % H and % L , that spending on treatment will be incurred only by high risks, and that the insurer will offer self selecting policies that anticipate moral hazard), and ii. expected utility if uninformed (in which case, the individual cannot avail himself of opportunities for reducing hazard and the low risk policy is selected from the self selection menu).
In Appendix 1, it is shown that consumers who remain uninformed prefer policy L 2 to H under the two contract menu. Thus, the value of information is:
Using assumption (iv), (12) can be rewritten as:
Now the expression on the right side of (14) is simply the probability of being a high risk times the utility gain to a high risk policyholder times the reduced probability minus the probability of being a high risk times the treatment expenditure s L . Since s L is the maximum to problem (6b), this expression must be positive. Thus, the sign of N, and the private value of information is positive.
(B) The Private Value of Information if Consumers Expect Insurers to Offer the Three Contract Separating Menu. The value of information in this case is:
Using the self selection constraints (9a) and (9b), this becomes:
to which we add and
The first square bracket in (17) is positive from the equation (10a). Recalling the transformation of (12) into (13) 
which, for identical reasons to those used to sign equation (14), is positive. Thus, equation (17) is positive. This is inconsistent with the assumption that the uninformed would remain ignorant.
Figure 4 Three Contract Separating Equilibrium

Result
Our conclusion is that becoming informed is a dominant strategy for the uninformed consumers in the preliminary information game. It is optimal whether these consumers expect the firm to offer the two contract separating menu or the three contract separating menu. In equilibrium, the two contract separating menu is offered, all consumers purchase the policy designed for their risk type, and high risks invest in the level of treatment which is optimal for them ex post.
The private value of information is strictly positive under asymmetric information but is ambiguous under symmetric information (and will be negative unless the treatment option has sufficient value). The change in value of information is associated with its dissemination to insurers. In Appendix 2, we show two models to reveal that it is the ability to hide information status, rather than the ability to hide test results, that is pivotal in determining the value of information. The first model considers a situation in which test results are observable by insurers, but it is still possible for those with prior hidden information to masquerade as uninformed, i.e. information status cannot always be confirmed. The private value of information is strictly positive suggesting that it is not the suppression of test results that switches the value of information. The second model allows insurers to observe information status but hides test results from insurers. Here, information has an ambiguous private value and will be negative absent a significant treatment option. This suggests that information can have a negative private value only if information status is observable.
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THE SOCIAL VALUE OF INFORMATION
In this section, the social value of information revealed by checkups is addressed. To show that the social value of information revealed by tests is positive ,we show that the equilibrium allocation when the uninformed become informed is a Pareto improvement over the initial allocation. This is accomplished by showing that the ex ante expected utility for all initial types, informed low risks, informed high risks and uninformed, is unchanged or increased.
To derive the social value of information we compare equilibrium allocations under the prior information regime in which information is fixed at its initial endowments, with the allocation that prevails when all uninformed are tested. First, note that under the prior information regime there are three types and the contract set, H, U, L 3 depicted in Figure 4 , is efficient and incentive feasible with respect to this information endowment. However, the posterior information regime contains only the policies H, L 2 shown in Figure 3 . Consider the changes in expected utility to the three initial risk types resulting from the acquisition of information by type U. Those who were initially informed high risks receive an identical contract H with either information regime; thus there is no change in expected utility. The utility changes for the initially informed low risks require a little more attention. In the prior information regime, low risks will hold contract L 3 which is defined by contract H and the binding self selection constraints (9a) and (9b). In contrast, low risks will hold contract L 2 in the posterior information regime which is defined by the same contract H and the self selection constraint
. Noting the assumption that p H (s) > p U (s) for any s and the single crossing property of the indifference curves, it follows that the joint constraints (9a) and (9b) would not bind if imposed on problem (7). Thus, L 2 is defined by weaker constraints than, and is strictly preferred to, L 3 . Finally, those who were initially uninformed reap a positive change in expected utility shown as follows. The initially uninformed hold contract U in the prior information regime but obtain H with probability % H and contract L 2 with probability % L if they become informed. Therefore the change in expected utility is:
Note that in the previous section, the value of information to the uninformed if consumers expect insurers to offer the three contract menu was:
But we have just argued that v(L 2 , p L ) > v(L 3 , p L ) which implies that v is positive and that the initially uninformed will have an increase in expected utility. Thus the initially informed low risks and the initially uninformed will have an increase in expected utility when the uninformed are tested while high risks remain unaffected. Therefore, the social value of information is positive.
Result
Since the social value of information revealed by the tests is positive and the equilibrium strategy for the uninformed is to become informed as shown in the previous section, private insurance markets provide socially optimal incentives for acquiring hidden knowledge when there are some initially informed high and low risk agents. Now consider the social value of information when there is no treatment option (p H = p H (0) is a constant and s i = 0 for all i). The initially informed high risks obtain contract H which provides full insurance under both information regimes. The initially informed low risks are strictly better off when the uninformed become informed because of the weaker self selection constraint in the two contract menu (as is the case with the treatment option). The change in expected utility for the uninformed is:
and the value of information for the uninformed in the three contract case is:
As
, p L ) because of the weaker self selection constraint with the two contract menu so v is positive and the social value of information also is positive. In contrast to the social value of information, the private value of information to the uninformed is zero without the treatment option. With no treatment option, information would have no value to the uninformed although it does benefit the informed low risks who have lower signaling costs when the uninformed take the test and the allocation is the two contract menu. So the presence of the treatment option is the key to the private market's ability to provide socially optimal incentives for acquiring hidden information.
The assumption that there are initially informed and uninformed consumers is important for our analysis. With no initially informed consumers the equilibrium will be for consumers to remain uninformed with no consumers tested or receiving treatment. To sustain the equilibrium analyzed above, we need at least one initially informed H type who can masquerade as uninformed.
SUMMARY
When the results of diagnostic tests are confidential to consumers and there is a treatment option available to those revealed to be high risks, the sequential Nash separating equilibrium has insurers expecting consumers to become informed. In turn, the private value of the information in the checkup is positive. The positive private value of information arises from the treatment option it bestows on those turning out to be high risk. A positive private value of information arises not from the suppression of the test results but from the inability of insurers to verify who is informed and who is not.
18 With hidden information status, informed policyholders cannot be forced to hold any policy that is worse than the policy they would have held if uninformed. Thus, in the Nash equilibrium, all consumers will submit to the checkup and will be informed. We also show that acquisition of hidden information by the uninformed preserves or expands expected utility for all initial risk and information types (informed high risks, informed low risks and uninformed). Thus the social value of information is positive and we conclude that competitive insurance markets will provide socially optimal incentives for the gathering of hidden information when there are some initially informed consumers and a treatment option. From (6a) and (6b),
ß H >ß L implies that the left hand side of (A3) is positive. But since the left hand side is less than the right hand side, the right hand side cannot be negative as it must be if H > L . Therefore, equation ( Proof of (10a) and (10b). Consider Figure 5 : I(p U ) is the indifference curve through both U and L for an uninformed individual. I(p H (s L )) is the indifference curve through L of a high risk with treatment level s L . Note that I(p H (s L )) is flatter than I(p U ) and passes to the southwest of U. This implies that a high risk with treatment level s L buying policy L has lower utility than if he/she were to purchase U with treatment level s L . And since s U maximizes utility at U, it implies that a high risk with treatment level s L buying policy L has lower utility than if he/she were to purchase U with treatment level s U . This proves condition (10a), and condition (9a) and (10a) imply condition (10b).
Proof of (10c).
(10a) can be restated as:
to both sides of (A5) gives:
or, using (9c): 
Figure 5
)} > 0 by (9c) and the fact that s U > s H , and since p U < p H (s U ):
Proof of (10d) and (10e). (10d) follows from the fact that the indifference curve for low risks through L is steeper than the indifference curve for uninformed risks through L. Replacing the p U with p L in inequality (A9) of the preceding proof of (10c) Doherty and Thistle (1996) demonstrate this result in a setting with endogenous testing but where loss probabilities are fixed.
APPENDIX 2
Does Public Testing Discourage Information Gathering?
While our analysis of the symmetric information benchmark case showed that fully public information may tend to discourage medical testing (unless the value of the treatment option is sufficiently high), the analysis of the asymmetric information case showed that testing is encouraged when test status and test results are hidden from insurers. To isolate the effects of "publicness" on the value of information, and to understand the intuition behind these results, we examine two intermediate cases with partial asymmetry of information. First, we will show that when test results are public knowledge but, due to prior hidden information, the insurer cannot distinguish between uninformed and high risks with private information on risk status, the test has a positive private value to the uninformed. The second illustration is where information status is clearly observed by insurers, but test results are not divulged. Here, testing is discouraged. These results suggest that the value of information rest mainly on whether insurers observe the information status (and not on whether they observe the test results).
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Consider first those who take the test. Insurers observe the test results and can therefore separate high and low risk policies selectively to each type. Bearing in mind that high risks will select s H after having purchased insurance, insurers will offer them policy H (shown in Figure 4 ). Since there is no moral hazard issue for known low risks, insurers will offer low risks policy L* (shown in Figure 1 ). Now turn to the uninformed. If the test is public knowledge, insurers will know who has taken the test and who has not. Those that have not taken a public test can either be uninformed or have pre-existing hidden information. Clearly, hidden low risks would take the test, since they would otherwise be indistinguishable from the uninformed and from hidden high risks and would bear appropriate signaling costs. Thus, the insurer can safely assume that those not having taken a public test are either uninformed or are hidden high risks. So the only two classes of policyholders that the insurer cannot identify are hidden high risks and the uninformed; all others can be offered designated policies according to their type.
A Nash equilibrium in which hidden low risks and uninformed are offered a pooling policy is not possible (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 ). Thus, the only possible Nash equilibrium is a separating one in which hidden high risks are offered a policy H and uninformed are offered a policy U which satisfies the self selection constraint: v(H, p H (s H )) -s H = v(U, p H (s U ) -s U ),
where s H is the high risk choice of treatment if they have policy H and s U is high risk treatment with policy U. This self selection constraint is identical to (9a) and policies H and U are two of the policies identified in the three contract equilibrium illustrated in Figure 4 . Now consider whether the uninformed will choose to take the public test. Recalling that low risks will receive the policy L*, the private value of information is: 
As shown in the body of the text, (A13) is positive. However, N a and N differ only by the offer of L* or L 3 to informed low risks and L* is preferred to L by this group. Thus, by transitivity, N a >N>0. Now consider the following facts which may seem a little implausible but will help separate the role of asymmetry about the information status from asymmetry about test results. We start with both informed and uninformed types. The informed have hidden information and the uninformed can choose to take the test. However, now the insurer is assumed to know the information status of everyone but does not have access to test results. These assumptions differ from those in the asymmetric information case in the body of the text only in that the information status in now observable. The informed can be identified by the insurer, but since the insurer cannot distinguish risk type, the separating menu H and L shown in Figure 3 (this menu follows from Node 2 in Figure 2 ) is offered only to those who have taken the test or are known by the insurer to have prior information. Since the uninformed can be identified, they can be offered a designated full insurance and fairly priced policy U* (see Figure 3) . Now, the private value of information is:
This can be rewritten as: The first line is the value of a fair classification lottery over full information policies (with no treatment elected for high risks). This is clearly negative for reasons described in the benchmark case. The second line is the signaling cost that tested low risks must incur to distinguish themselves from tested high risks. This line too is negative. Only the final line, the value of the treatment option, is positive. Thus, unless the treatment option has significant value, testing is clearly discouraged when information status is observable by the insurer.
